

Law that emphasized love within marriage. He fails to recognize that prior to the Maoist era, males frequently sought out love through patronizing courtesans, and that as a result of the New Culture movement, both males and females were encouraged to seek love through marriage. Failure to examine the issue in its historical context shakes the author's argument that the CCP policy contributes to the changing sexual culture.

While a major theme of the book is the complexity of the interaction between state governance and individual rights, at least in certain areas, the state has maintained a repressive role. For instance, as Li Yinhe points out in her chapter, the state continues to apprehend and interrogate gay men. Gary Sigley also criticizes the state's repression and prohibition of premarital and extramarital sex for the purpose of maintaining stability.

This book weaves in a wealth of knowledge about the intertwined relationships between the changing sexual culture in China and the government policy, in an effort to show the complexity of a state that both creates and regulates the new spaces of sexual entrepreneurship and consumption, and the new forms of sexuality. It will be welcomed by a wide array of scholars who have an interest in sexuality studies in contemporary China.

TIANTIAN ZHENG

Mao: The Unknown Story.

JUNG CHANG AND JON HALLIDAY

London: Jonathan Cape, 2005

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Mao: The Unknown Story is a very singular piece of work. The authors claim that their book is the only full and truly objective account of Mao's life ever published. They have undoubtedly corrected some erroneous views previously accepted, but their claim that what others have said is often wrong, while everything they state is entirely accurate, is somewhat exaggerated. This fact is reflected in the widely different reviews published on the book's first appearance, the majority of them enthusiastically favourable, but some of them sharply critical. Both of these contain elements of the truth.

The opening sentence of the book reads "Mao Tse-tung, who for decades held absolute power over the lives of one-quarter of the world's population, was responsible for well over 70 million deaths in peacetime" (p. 3). Leaving aside the exact figure, which has been estimated by well-informed writers at between 40 and 70 million, this statement might appropriately have been left until the later part of the book, to which it effectively applies. Its appearance at the very beginning, even before the date of Mao's birth, underscores Jun Chang's hostility to Mao, eloquently spelled out in *Wild Swans*. Her feelings are more than understandable in the light of her experience, but they have sometimes led to rather one-sided views.

As a concrete example of this, I begin with the first substantial piece of writing by Mao available to us, his marginal notes on Friedrich Paulsen's *System of Ethics*, composed in 1917 and 1918. Apart from the inherent interest of this text, it provides a striking illustration of the approach followed by the authors throughout the whole of their book, which consists in emphasizing as often as possible those aspects of Mao's thought and behaviour which can be used against him. It is true that this work by the 24-year-old Mao contains many provocative and unpleasant statements, but it

also includes passages of a different kind, which the authors ignore or distort. Here I will cite only a small number of examples.

The authors begin with the following quotation from Mao: “I do not agree with the view that to be moral, the motive of one’s action has to be benefiting others. ... People like me want to ... satisfy our hearts to the full, and in doing so we automatically have the most valuable moral codes. Of course there are people and objects in the world, but they are all there only for me” (p. 13, their translation). This bluntly self-centred passage corresponds to a theme which is frequently reiterated in Mao’s notes on Paulsen. Immediately before it, however, in the same long paragraph, we read: “Self-interest is indeed primary for human beings, but it does not stop here. It is also part of our nature to extend this to helping others. Self-interest is primarily benefiting one’s own spirit. ... Benefiting the spirit means benefiting the feelings and the will. For example, since I cannot forget the feeling I have toward the one I love, my will desires to save her, and I will do everything possible to save her, to the point that if the situation is desperate, I would rather die myself than let her die. Only thus can my feelings be satisfied, and my will fulfilled” (S. Schram, *Mao’s Road to Power*, M.E. Sharpe, 1992, Vol. 1, p. 205).

Another Mao quotation cited in the Chang and Halliday book reads: “People like me are not building achievements for future generations” (p. 13). The authors’ comment is: “Mao did not care what he left behind” (*ibid.*). But a neighbouring passage in Mao’s own text, which they do not cite, reads: “Helping those in need..., treading fearlessly in the face of danger and sacrificing oneself to serve others are no more than duty, since I desire to do them, and only then will my mind be at rest” (*Mao’s Road to Power*, Vol. 1, p. 277).

Chang and Halliday state categorically that the central elements in Mao’s character, meaning primarily the negative elements, as revealed in this text, “stayed consistent for the remaining six decades of his life, and define his rule” (p. 13). One may doubt whether anyone’s life, and especially such a varied life as that of Mao, could remain basically unchanged for over half a century. The two authors do, however, apparently believe this. Summing up the lessons of the Hunan Peasant Report of February 1927, as they see them, they write: “Mao discovered in himself a love for bloodthirsty thuggery. This gut enjoyment, which verged on sadism, meshed with, but preceded, his affinity for Leninist violence. Mao did not come to violence via theory. The propensity sprang from his character, and was to have a profound impact on his future methods of rule” (p. 41). This is, in fact, a central theme of the entire volume.

In the balance of this relatively brief review of a very long book, I will deal with Mao’s later years, but because of the emphasis the authors have given it, I will comment briefly on the crossing of the Dadu River in May 1935. Chang and Halliday describe this as “the center of the Long March myth created by Mao” (p. 158). In their view, it was “a complete invention” (p. 159). There was no battle at the Dadu Bridge (pp. 158–59). Otto Braun, no friend of Mao’s, has, however, confirmed his account of the events, as have Zhang Boyan and others (see Gregor Benton and Steve Tsang, “Opportunism, betrayal, and manipulation in Mao’s Rise to Power: Enquiring into the Chang-Halliday *Secret Story* of how China went Red,” *China Journal*, No. 55, June 2006).

According to Chang and Halliday, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Stalin personally cabled Mao several times in late 1941 asking him to keep the Japanese occupied, when the Germans were at the gates of Moscow, but Mao refused to do so. This infuriated the Soviets, especially when he advised them to retreat to the Urals and fight a guerrilla war. Word got around that Mao had said, “Stalin cannot beat Hitler.”

A striking instance of the differing assessments of Mao's human qualities can be found by comparing Chang and Halliday's account of his reaction to the news of his son Mao Anying's death in November 1950 while serving in Korea with that of Philip Short. Chang and Halliday's version reads: "[w]hen Mao was given the news of his son's death, he was silent for some time, and then murmured: 'In a war, how can there be no deaths?' Mao's secretary observed: 'He really didn't show any expression of great pain'" (p. 395). Short's account, in his biography, reads: "When Peng [Dehuai] next saw Mao, and blurted out how ashamed he was at not having protected better Anying (whose superior he was), Mao was brutally confronted with news for which he was totally unprepared – that his eldest son had died. He crumpled, Peng remembered, trembling so violently that he could not light his cigarette. For several minutes, they sat in complete silence. Then Mao lifted his head. "In revolutionary war," he said, "you always pay a price. Anying was one of thousands. You shouldn't take it as something special just because he was my son" (*Mao, A Life*, Hodder & Stoughton, 1999, p. 434). This seems to me more convincing.

On 2 February 1953, the new US president, Eisenhower, suggested that he might use the atomic bomb on China. This threat, state the authors, was "music to Mao's ears," (p. 390) as he now had an excuse to ask Stalin for what he wanted most: nuclear weapons. Stalin did not want to give Mao the Bomb, and according to the authors, it was "under this unremitting pressure – from Mao, as much as from the West – that Stalin decided to end the Korean War. He made this decision on 28 February, and told his colleagues that he was planning to act next day. That night Stalin was felled by a stroke, which killed him on 5 March. Mao, the authors write, "may have helped cause Stalin's stroke" (p. 391). Others have made the same suggestion, but there is no serious evidence to this effect.

It is impossible in this brief review to deal in detail with the major problems raised by the last decades of Mao's life, but some of the issues and Chang and Halliday's reaction to them must be noted. As is well known, the so-called "Great Leap Forward" launched by Mao in May 1958 led to widespread starvation and a large number of deaths over a period of four years. The first official estimate in 1980 by Hu Yaobang puts the death toll at 20 million. Philip Short regards 20 to 30 million as the most credible, noting that "it is, in all conscience, enough." Chang and Halliday (pp. 456–57), arrive at a figure of 37.67 millions, which may well be the most accurate.

In 1965, Mao began the "Cultural Revolution," with the support of Lin Biao. Among the victims was Lao She, who had been kicked, punched, and struck with brass-buckled belts, and who drowned himself the next day in a lake. Unlike Stalin, who had carried out his purges using the KGB, which rapidly hustled the victims out of sight, Mao saw to it that much of the violence and humiliation was carried out in public. "Photographing torture had hitherto been rare under Mao," the authors note, but "it was done extensively in the Cultural Revolution. ... As Mao's usual practice was not to keep records for posterity, let alone proof of torture, the most likely explanation ... is that he took pleasure in viewing pictures of his foes in agony" (p. 544).

Mention might be made of Mao's meeting with Nixon, in February 1972. The accounts varied according to the views of the observers. Philip Short indicates that at Zhou Enlai's insistence, Nixon was allowed to rest and to have lunch after his arrival, before going to Mao's residence, Zhongnanhai. Chang and Halliday, on the other hand, indicate that he was not allowed even to take a shower before joining Mao. The conversation lasted 65 minutes, which Short regarded as a long time, and Chang and Halliday as a "relatively brief" meeting (p. 606).

Four years later, Mao was dead. He had outlived Zhou Enlai, whom he had prevented from getting treatment for cancer before it was too late, but he must have been aware that Deng Xiaoping might one day be his successor.

What can we say by way of conclusion? Chang and Halliday declare: “Mao Tse-tung had become the Stalin of the CCP.” There is obviously an element of truth in this formulation, but Mao was a more complex and subtle figure.

Though I have expressed disagreement with some aspects of Chang and Halliday’s account of his life, their book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the man and his place in history. It is desirable, however, in order to form a more complete and balanced picture, to read one or both of the other relatively recent 600-page books, that by Philip Short and that by Mao’s doctor, Li Zhisui.

STUART SCHRAM

Mao’s Last Revolution.

RODERICK MACFARQUHAR AND MICHAEL SCHOENHALS

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It is impossible to be neutral about the Cultural Revolution, the name we give to the decade of political purges, social turmoil and economic malaise that characterized Mao Zedong’s vaunted “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” of 1966–69 and the aftermath of brutish mass campaigns, purges, forced migrations and idiotic study campaigns that lasted until Mao’s death in 1976. Yet, how does one make sense of why it happened, what exactly happened, and what it all means? If we cannot assume objectivity, at least we can strive for a sound basis for viewing this history. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals provide sure footing in their meticulously documented and richly detailed account of this massive, historic and ironic national tragedy. With some 460 pages of text and nearly 200 pages of notes and back matter, the result is surely the definitive political history of the Cultural Revolution for our generation.

While MacFarquhar and Schoenhals have their judgment of the Cultural Revolution – that it is a watershed in modern Chinese history that made the post-Mao economic reforms possible by dint of killing popular respect for the CCP – the strength of the book is in the meat, the details, the complexities of the Chairman, his closest colleagues, Party faithful (and unfaithful), and faces from the millions who believed, used, or otherwise acted on the Supreme Instructions from the Centre. In their dedication to accounting to some degree for the major events around Mao and directly precipitated by Mao’s leadership, MacFarquhar and Schoenhals quash easy summary judgments. Clearly, no Mao, no Cultural Revolution. The Chairman alone bears fundamental moral responsibility for the catastrophe. The authors document Mao’s agency in each concrete act of treachery, deceit, or refusing to save a colleague when he could. But Mao could not have thrown the country into turmoil alone. Through the details, the culpability of his senior colleagues comes through. Most depressing is the role of Zhou Enlai, China’s grey eminence. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals properly wonder if Zhou had put his clout and reputation, not to mention his extensive bureaucratic network, behind standing up to Mao at a number of key points would not the carnage have been avoided or mitigated? Additionally, they vividly portray the distortions of Cultural Revolution campaigns at the local